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by
Stanley Wenocur & Michael Reisch
University of Maryland
School of Social Work & Community Planning
The idea of Christian brotherly love.., in a society
founded on serfdom remains an unrealizeable and, in
this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended
meaning is, in good faith, a motive for the conduct of
the individual. To live consistently in the light of
brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on
the same principle is impossible. The individual in
his personal conduct is always compelled--in so far as
he does not resort to breaking up the existing social
structure--to fall short of his own nobler motives.
Karl Mannheim (1936: 195)
Introduction
The phenomenon of professionalization has been an exceptional-
ly powerful force in Western industrialized countries for more
than a century. "The professions are as characteristic of the
modern world as the crafts were of the ancient," said Stephen R.
Graubard in the preface to The Professions in America (1963).
Talcott Parsons (1968) declared that "The development and increas-
ing strategic importance of the professions probably constitute
the most important change that has occurred in the occupational
system of modern countries." Dry statistics alone bear out these
views. In the United States "professionals" increased in the
population from 859 per 100,000 in 1870 to 3,310 in 1950 (Goode,
1957). In absolute numbers professional and technical workers
increased from 350,000 in 1870 to 12.5 million in 1974. In 1900
professional and technical workers represented only 4.3% of the
workforce; by 1970 they were 14.4% (Galper, 1975: 56).
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Professional and Technical Workers in the
United States: 1870-1974 (April)
1870 1910 1940 1950 1970 1974
340,000 1,655,270 3,497,100 4,490,000 11,140,000 12,446,000
These figures are indicative of profound changes in our
political economy, characterized by some observers in the 1970's
as "post-industrial" (Bell, 1973; Heilbroner, 1973; Gartner and
Riessman, 1974). Its central feature is that economic growth has
shifted from the goods-producing sectors to the information and
service-producing sectors. The dramatic growth of social work in
the last two decades (recent cut-backs notwithstanding) has been
part of this larger shift in the political economy, as the expan-
sion of the welfare state has been a substantial ingredient of
service sector expansion.
The figures on the growth of professional and technical work-
ers mask a considerable amount of conflict about professionaliza-
tion and its implications for social democracy. Professions are
an integral part of our system of social stratification. In terms
of status and rewards, they lie near the top of the occupational
hierarchy, much higher than technical occupations. The citadels
of professionalism are carefully protected by ideological, politi-
cal, and economic barriers. In 1970 some 2,200 occupations re-
quired highly skilled workers. In a study decrying this "profes-
sionalization of everyone," Wilensky (1964), a sociologist, could
only find 18 occupations at best, including social work, that
might make a reasonable claim to professional status.
Social workers have coveted professional status. Their desire
and the course of their struggle for its realization have been
shaped by broader political economic conditions. At the same time
social workers as professionals have also struggled to create a
more egalitarian and a qualitatively richer society. (Other pro-
fessionals have also done so.) These conflicting interests have
created a unique tension within social work, a kind of marginal
consciousness about its position in society. Because of it, so-
cial workers occasionally have been able to reflect on their role
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in preserving practices and institutions that perpetuate inequi-
ties. This kind of self-conscious deliberation requires an atten-
ton to political economic analysis. Naturally it has been
strongest during periods of cataclysmic social upheaval, when the
entire society has been forced to focus on political economic con-
ditions. But it has also appeared at other times as a kind of
persistent counterpoint to social work's main themes. When it
happens, social workers expand their capacity to shape the charac-
ter of their work.
The ideology surrounding professions has obscured social
work's past and present relationships to political economic
events. Both the schools and the professional associations whose
purpose is to advance professionalization usually fail to examine
social work critically from this perspective. One consequence is
that social workers always seem to be contending with a series of
recurrent professional issues--whether schools should train
generic or specialist practitioners; whether caseworkers should be
involved in social reform and reformers in casework; whether or
not private practice is a "sell-out", etc.--whose relevance and
implications cannot be thoroughly assessed because their political
economic character is washed out. Another consequence is that the
options that social workers might have for working towards social
construction are not fully explored.
Sociological Perspectives on Professionalization
Because "an industrializing society is a professionalizing
society" (Goode, 1960), prevailing ideas about professions and the
quest for professionalization have more than academic significance
for an aspiring occupation. They serve as an ideological screen
through which other societal events are sifted out, either to be
acted on or neglected. To comprehend the effects on social work
of its struggle for professional status, we need to make explicit
the screens through which professionalization has customarily been
viewed, as well as our own position.
The ideology of professions appears in two important forms.
The first, which will not be our focus here, concerns the degree
to which the scientific-technical knowledge base within a particu-
lar profession--the sina qua non for claimants to the title--is
riddled with ideology, and the circumstances wherein this
ideological content is most likely to arise. Scientific princi-
ples informing practice are seldom complete enough to enable prac-
titioners to explain, control, or predict all the practice situa-
tions they encounter. In order for professions to maintain an
aura of competence, consensually validated ideologies--beliefs,
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normative principles, expectations, and "practice wisdom"--fill
the gaps, also leaving room for competing ideological belief sys-
tems to arise. These ideological elements are especially likely
to surface (1) when a professional field experiences social pres-
sures to produce "professional" behavior, (2) where the applica-
tion of theory to practice requires or allows for a high degree of
subjectivity, intuition, or particularistic values, and (3) where
the content and behavior of professional practice involves many
moral and ethical considerations (Holzner and Marx, 1979: 258,6).
The second form of professional ideology deals with the bits
and pieces of ideology surrounding professionalization. These are
the empirically unproven assumptions, values, and theories at-
tached to the idea of professions and taken as "truths" that offer
an interpretation of their relationship to man, nature, and
society in its parts and as a dynamic whole. Aspiring occupation-
al groups have fallen back on such ideological material to pursue
their claims to professional status; established professions use
it to maintain their privileged position.
The Structural-Functional and Processual Perspectives
The structural-functional perspective has probably been the
most powerful lens through which professions have been studied.
It is rife with ideology. In this view, professions are part of
the natural elaboration of an organic social structure accompany-
ing modernization. The social and technological changes set off
by the industrial revolution created specialized needs that could
no longer be met by traditional institutions like family busi-
nesses and small communities. In the economic sphere, new occupa-
tions arose in response to these needs. As they developed a dis-
tinctive and "responsible' expertise based on scientific-technical
knowledge and an ethical code, they gained community sanction and
progressed up the occupational ladder to professional rank.
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958: 286-7) offer a clear illustration of
this perspective in their explanation for why "demand" for a pro-
fession of social work arose.
Specialization itself, a prerequisite for profes-
sionalism, is the result of the underlying in-
dustrialization process. Rising productivity and in-
come not only permit but force the eventual withdrawal
of population from farming and manufacturing. These
people are channeled into the tertiary service
"industries"--service professions and occupations of
all kinds, from physicians and social workers to
beauticians and television repair service men...
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The growth in scale and complexity of social organiza-
tions--business corporations, labor unions, profes-
sional groups, social agencies, units of government--is
likewise a factor, because it creates a demand for
liaison and contact men of all kinds. We need guides,
so to speak, through a new kind of civilized jungle.
Social work is an example par excellence of the liaison
function...
Also involved in the shift towards professionalization
is the prestige of science... The empirical, critical,
rational spirit of science has found its way into near-
ly every type of activity in America. And it has be-
come particularly important to social work because the
neighboring, established professions, especially
medicine, to which social work looks for its model of
professionalism, stresses scientific knowledge as the
basis for professional practice.
The functional importance and positive contribution of profes-
sions to the larger society is a central assumption of the
structural/functional perspective. Professions are seen as ratio-
nal, "stabilizing elements in society." "They engender modes of
life, habits of thought, and standards of judgement which render
them centers of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady
and peaceful evolution"... They function "to bring knowledge to
the service of power" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 497,499).
They "dominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render
obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of authoritarianism and
capitalistic exploitation" (Parsons, 1968: 546). On an interna-
tional level, professions even help to maintain world order
through the communication among intellectual leaders of different
countries (Lynn, 1965: xiii).
In the sociology of professions, structural-functionalists
have devoted a good deal of energy to investigating the attributes
that distinguish professions from other occupations. A core list
of attributes culled from this work would be as follows (Holzner
and Marx, 1979; Ritzer, 1972: 1) an abstract, theoretical
knowledge base; 2) an esoteric, specialized, technical skill; 3) a
long period of training and socialization; 4) strong professional
subculture and ideology; 5) lifelong commitment to a structured
career; 6) autonomy of action; 7) a formal occupational associa-
tion; 8) control over training and legal licensing; 9) a code of
ethics and/or a client-centered orientation--the service ideal.
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With the exceptions of the archetypes of law and medicine,
however, sociologists disagree as to which occupations actually
meet the criteria. The solution to this troublesome problem has
been to place occupations on a continuum of professionalization
with the ideal-types of law and medicine demarcating the outer
professional pole and other unskilled occupations, such as
janitoring, the opposite non-professional pole. Then the more of
the "differentia specifica" (Barber, 1965) held by an occupational
group, usually with heavier weighting for scientific knowledge
combined with a formalized service ideal, the higher the rating on
the scale of professionalization (Greenwood, 1957). This approach
has lent support to labeling some occupations as "emergent," or
"marginal" (Wilensky, 1964), or "semi-professional" (Etzioni,
1969), based on possession of these attributes in only moderate
degree.
The structural-functional perspective, as the name implies,
derives from that particular theoretical perspective in sociology.
The processual approach has focused mainly on the question of how
occupations actually achieve the status of professions. This em-
phasis, more than a particular sociological perspective, is what
distinguishes it from the structural-functional. Authors who have
studied the process of professionalization draw on functionalism
as well as social exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, and
conflict theory.
Though not incompatible with functional assumptions about the
role of professions in society, in general, examinations of the
process of professionalization have revealed that the elaboration
of social structure is not an inherently orderly process and that
occupational groupings play an active part in engineering their
changes in status. The view is a politically pluralistic, dynamic
one wherein occupational prestige, treated as a scarce resource,
becomes the object of competing interests within a single occupa-
tional sphere or in the larger division of labor, or both. Social
changes create conditions necessitating specialization, profes-
sionalization, and bureaucratization, but these necessary condi-
tions are not sufficient in and of themselves to account for the
differential rise of occupations in the status hierarchy. If the
conditions are right (a situation to be viewed dynamically rather
than statically), an occupational grouping or sub-segment, much
like a social movement, can organize itself and act strategically
to improve its occupational ranking (Bucher and Strauss, 1961).
Several authors have outlined the steps or stages over time of
the professionalization process (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933;
Caplow, 1954; Hughes, 1958; Wilensky, 1964). They generally agree
on the substance of the steps, if not on the particular sequence.
-689-
For our purposes, Wilensky's summary is illustrative (1964: 145-
46).
In sum, there is a typical process by which the es-
tablished professions have arrived: men begin doing the
work full time and stake out a jurisdiction; the early
masters of technique or adherents of the movement become
concerned about standards of training and practice and
set up a training school, which if not lodged in univer-
sities at the outset makes academic connection within
two or three decades; the teachers and activists then
achieve success in promoting more effective organiza-
tion, first local, then national--through either the
transformation of an existing occupational association
or the creation of a new one. Toward the end, legal
protection of the monopoly of skill appears; at the end,
a formal code of ethics is adopted.
"Many occupations engage in heroic struggles for professional
identification; few make the grade" (Wilensky, 1964). Therefore,
for the processualists, attributes that the structural-
functionalists consider as static distinguishing characteristics,
-particularly scientific-technical knowledge and professional
norms- may be used strategically by an occupational group or sub-
segment to advance their status goals and to debase the competing
claims of other groups, In simplified outline, the knowledge-
skill base links the concept of profession in the public mind to
the prestige and positive ideology of science and higher learning;
the service ideal separates professionalized occupations from com-
mercial enterprises. Other traits are derivative of these. To
gain sophisticated technical skill and scientific knowledge, a
lengthy training period is required in a university, which at the
same time provides a thorough socialization-into-the-profession
experience. University sanction also furnishes a valuable stamp
of legitimation to the aspiring group which enables them to claim
the privileges from society of autonomy of action, control over
its training, authority over its clientele in functionally
specific areas, and eventually the legal right to title and domain
through licensing and/or other benefits. The claims of an occupa-
tion to these various privileges are further bolstered by promo-
tion of a professional code of ethics and service ideal, which
also serves to reassure the public that the interests of the
client and the community will take precedence over the desire for
commercial profit.
2
In some instances, the processual line of inquiry has chal-
lenged functional assumptions about the homogeneity among members
of a profession. Rather than studying individual professions as
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communities of shared values, identification, roles, and interests
and then identifying the mechanisms that help to create this cohe-
siveness, such as socialization and selectivity processes (Goode,
1957), Bucher and Strauss (1962: 326) argued that professions are
"loose amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in
different manners and more or less held together under a common
name at a particular period in history." Within organized
medicine, the prototypical profession, one can find great diver-
gences, for example, according to specializations (radiology vs.
pathology vs. family medicine); sense of mission to support spe-
cial expertise (within surgery, the struggles between proctology
and urology for separate identities); work activities (the public
health physician vs. the anesthesiologist); methodology and tech-
niques (within psychology the physiologists vs. the therapist);
client rlationships (the pathologists with little patient contact
vs. clinicians). Given these differences, professional associa-
tions become "battlegrounds as different emerging segments compete
for control" of the organization and its resources for influencing
the general membership, societal elites, and the public at large.
In sum, the processual perspective takes a developmental view
of professionalization, which ranges, depending upon the author,
from a naturally unfolding, evolutionary process to a highly
politicized, conflictual one resembling a social movement. 3 In
this process, the attributes that separate professions from other
occupations may be used instrumentally to advance a group's inter-
ests. Steps in the professionalization process can be identified,
the details of which, in a broader context of modernization, help
to explain the differential status of occupations in the division
of labor.
A Critique
Both the structural-functional and the processual perspectives
accept and build on the values and remnants of an older aristocra-
cy as these were carried forward under a new set of conditions--
the industrial revolution. The structural approach is essentially
a-historical (Ritzer, 1975); so really is the processual, despite
the ostensible historicity of developmental stages. Ideological-
ly, both still take established professions, the so-called
"learned professions," as a point of departure, a standard against
which the characteristics and developmental patterns of newer
claimants are measured and found wanting. Furthermore, the stan-
dard may be applied unevenly, as when Wilensky (1964) assumed that
only the established professions had followed a "natural history
of professionalism," while new and emerging professions were
"opportunistic."
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From a strictly methodological viewpoint, the use of "es-
tablished" professions as the basis for formulating criteria to
distinguish professions and their developmental patterns from non-
professions has serious scientific consequences. Assuming the
existence of commonalities among the established professions, the
approach set off a search for them, while sliding over their dif-
ferences. At the same time it also tended to limit the investiga-
tion of similarities between the established professions and other
occupations in favor of a search for differences. The outcome has
been a state of conceptual/definitional confusion requiring a
series of ad hoc justifications for the differential attributes
that have been identified. Since many phenomena have been ex-
cluded, the resulting "theory of professions" has violated the
rule of parsimony in theory construction.
A bit of ideology that has stubbornly clung to the profes-
sional concept has been its ethical purity. The view that profes-
sions are beneficial for society flows from this a priori defini-
tional relationship between professions and the service ideal as a
distinguishing attribute. In the functionalist approach, it is
not that professionals have typically altruistic motivations as
compared to the alleged "egoism" of businessmen. Rather, the ser-
vice ideal, which broadly includes such professional norms as dis-
passionate objectivity, is carried out in professional role be-
havior because it is useful for providing more efficient service.
Professional roles, in turn, are supported by an institutional
context of "science and liberal learning" which is radically dif-
ferent from the institutional context of commerce (Parsons, 1938:
46-8). This image justifies the proposition that professionals
represent an intellectual status group or class which can guide
the public interest because they somehow operate beyond the bounds
of bourgeois imperatives.
A substantial amount of empirical data suggest that profes-
sionals have not quite transcended the pushes and pulls of
capitalistic competition. The alternative proposition that pro-
fessional organizations and professional morality serve to in-
crease the economic gains of professional practitioners and the
status of their vocations is more defensible. In an early com-
parative study of professions, Friedman and Kuznets (1945: 391)
found that "professional workers constitute a 'non-competing'
group" in the marketplace, whose average earnings in comparable
communities were from 85% to 180% higher than those of non-
professional workers. Furthermore, they found that medical soci-
eties in the United States contributed to the comparatively higher
salaries of physicians over dentists by their greater monopolistic
control of entry into the profession. The monopolistic practices
of the American Medical Association (AMA) have been analyzed by
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Garceau (1941), Hyde and Wolff (1953-54), Kessel (1958, 1970), and
Rayback (1967) among others. Kessel (1958, 1970) showed how the
power of the AMA has supported profit-maximizing behavior by
physicians as well as the ways in which its activities have cir-
cumscribed the choice of contractual arrangements between patients
and physicians and reduced innovation in medical education. Ar-
nould (1972) found that the legal profession also engaged in mo-
nopolistic practices through the widespread use of fee schedules
akin to price-fixing, thereby raising the price structure of legal
services. This practice was struck down by the Supreme Court in
the 1970's.
Many authors have considered the detrimental effects for the
public of the licensing of occupations, a primary concern of pro-
fessional associations, and justified as a means of protecting the
public. Pfeffer (197 4a) found that governmental regulation and
occupational licensing have operated to restrict entry, increase
price, and protect and economically enhance an industry or occupa-
tion. In another study, Pfeffer (1974b) also showed that the more
professionalized the occupation, the more independent its income
was from local economic conditions. Fech's (1974) review of the
literature on the licensing of health occupations and professions
presents additional support for the allegation that licensure has
not protected the public interest on balance. Benham and Benham
(1975) found similar practices and effects on prices and services
in the optometry profession. Recent studies of the optometric
profession have also dispelled the functionalist notion that
greater technological sophistication has so improved the quality
of services that it offsets such dysfunctional consequences as
higher prices (Begun, 1979). Finally, in a slightly different
vein, Walsh and Elling (1968) found that among the public health
professionals in their study--nurses, sanitarians, and physi-
cians--the greater the striving for professional status of the
occupational group, the more negative their orientations to lower
class clients. These findings led Walsh and Elling to speculate
(1968:27) that:
...the class structure maintains itself in significant
part through the efforts of work groups as a whole to
establish themselves. In this process, the differen-
tial distribution of rewards affected by the class
structure operates not only through the money market
and its salaries and incomes, but through orientations
and behaviors of members of work groups which aid them
in avoiding identification and involvement with
detracting or devalued elements of society. The depth
of this human tragedy is suggested by the fact that
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those most in need of service are least likely to
receive it.
Much of the ideology surrounding professions is grounded in
historical misunderstanding. It is a misinterpretation of history
to equate today's concept of profession with the idea of the
"learned professions" of pre-industrial times. In pre-industrial
England (the most relevant source for the United States), the spe-
cialized functions now performed by established professions in a
given field were carried out by a variety of occupational group-
ings, whose members were both university educated or organized
into guilds with an apprenticeship system of training outside the
university. No profession could claim a unified occupational do-
main over which it reigned supreme. As Freidson (1970: 5-6)
pointed out with regard to medicine:
Its position is not a long established one; in fact, it
is less than a hundred years old. If medicine was a
'profession' in the past, it was a profession of quite
different characteristics than today's. During most of
recorded time there was not a single occupation iden-
tifiable as 'medicine' for there were many kinds of
healers. After the rise of the university in Europe,
medicine became primarily a 'learned profession'. Only
recently has it become a truly consulting profession,
and only recently has it attained the strength and
stability which now characterizes its preeminence.
Around the year 1200, universities grew up out of the guilds
of learning organized by teachers and students and soon came under
domination of the Church. For many years the ecclesiastics per-
formed many of the specialized functions we attribute to profes-
sions, but by the 15th century, p~rhaps earlier, secular associa-
tions, such as the Inns of Court,' and secular guilds provided the
aegis for carrying them out. "Thus the earliest forms of or-
ganization among surgeons, apothecaries, and notaries, and in a
certain sense also among common lawyers, took the shape of train-
ing guilds. These professions, therefore, unlike physicians,
civil servants, 5 and teachers, did not emerge out of the clerical
order" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 291). Nor did they re-
quire university-based education--as did physicians and civil
servants--to carry out their medical and legal functions.
In pre-modern Europe the social stratification system was
quite rigid, so that vocational groups, "learned" and "unlearned,"
came from different segments of society and often served different
social strata (Larson, 1977: 3). In this stratified social system
the university diploma was not sufficient to assure its learned
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f-_c;pknts control over an area of technical expertise. The
learned professions did not have a monopoly of practice in the
broader community.
On technical grounds the learned professions would have had a
hard time asserting their rights to exclusive occupational con-
trol. The scientific/technical knowledge obtainable in the
university was not necessarily more effective than the expertise
gained from practice. Nor was it practically oriented. In 17th
and 18th century Europe and the United States, university educa-
tion largely sought to educate gentlemen through a classical,
liberal arts orientation. It was more a mark of differential so-
cial status than it was scientific or utilitarian (Larson, 1977).
In Europe, scientific education did not penetrate medical educa-
tion until well into the industrial period, mid-19th century, and
in the United States, not until the late 19th century.
Despite differences in the social, political, and physical
features between the United States and Europe, the course of the
learned professions in America was strongly influenced by develop-
ments in Great Britain and Europe generally, so that the above
points still apply. For example, medical functions were performed
by diverse vocational groups--surgeons/barbers, physicians,
apothecaries, patent-medicine men, midwives--outside the control
of university based vocations or any other monopolistic healing
group up to the 19th century. And the results of the medical care
of the "non-educated" practitioners were often no worse than those
of the "learned professionals" of the day (Freidson, 1970: 20).
In 1775, some 3,500 practitioners, who were not graduates of any
medical school, gave most of the medical care in the country. Ac-
counts of the profession in the 18th century, which usually
describe it in terms of the activities of some 50, European-
trained men who played a prominent part in institutional medicine
or public life, distort the picture (Bell, 1970).
In short, the conception of profession as we understand it is
really a modern invention. Its pre-industrial heritage was quite
mixed--common and elite, "learned' and "unlearned." Modern pro-
fessions, as a sociological phenomenon, actually emerged together
within a relatively short, two-generational span of time, roughly
1825-1880 (Larson, 1977). The historical circumstances that im-
printed the first stage of professionalization for our present
professions were similar for all of them, namely the political,
economic, technological and ideological conditions of 'the great
transformation' from a pre-capitalist socio-economic system to
industrial capitalism.
6
Within this context, the "opportunistic" struggles of the es-
tablished professions for their exalted position would tell us
more about how and why some occupations succeeded than any static,
a priori versions of their creation. Empirical data on the
economics of professionalization support this logic. As Carr-
Saunders and Wilson realized in their pioneering study of profes-
sions with respect to law and medicine (1933: 304):
The evolution of the legal and medical professions was
anything but smooth; and something more than has yet
been said is required to account for so tangled a his-
tory. On reflection it appears that what happened in
both cases was the early segregation of practitioners,
advocates, and physicians, whose functon at a later
date was realized to be specialist. But the associa-
tions of these specialists, having attained great power
and prestige, attempted to inhibit the development of
general practitioners of law and medicine of whose ser-
vices the public had need. When they could not prevent
their appearance, they tried to keep them subservient,
and the history of both professions is largely con-
cerned with the problems so brought about.
These considerations taken together point to the need for an
alternative perspective on professions. The structural-functional
perspective and much of the thinking in the processual approach
begin with an a priori set of assumptions about the basis of the
occupational division of labor. Professions are implicitly or
explicitly the yardstick for assigning rank in the occupational
hierarchy; their characteristics are assumed to be beneficial to a
defineable public interest without regard to differential social
group interests, and functionally required for the development of
modern society. Some writers have assigned professionals a unique
status and role in society (Parsons, 1968: 536), "neither
'capitalists' nor 'workers', nor typically government administra-
tors or 'bureaucrats' ... independent peasant proprietors or mem-
bers of the small urban proprietary groups." Like Mannheim's in-
tellectuals (1936: 155-64), who are largely unattached to any so-
cial class and able to transcend their relations to the system of
social stratification because of their diverse origins and academy
training, professionals represent a new form of moral and intel-
lectual leadership for the society, based on the cultural criteria
of legitimacy rather than criteria of political power or economic
success" (Parsons, 1968: 545).
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
The central issue in a "theory of professions" is to account
for the variance in the occupational hierarchy. Why is it that
some occupations have been able to achieve and maintain a special
status that has come to be identified as professional? Profess-
sions as we know them arose in the division of labor during the
industrial era. In advanced industrial societies this division of
labor has become complex and specialized. We do not assume at the
same time that the professional phenomenon is the crowning
achievement of the industrial revolution, or a requirement of in-
dustrialization, found in the same form across all industrial so-
cieties, and/or certain to continue with little change into the
future. To do so is to accept a restrictive ideology propounded
by professionals themselves that ignores contradictory data so as
to preserve a particular social order. In theory development,
variables must be able to vary, and the concept of profession can-
not be both the independent and the dependent variable.
Status is a human artifact. As Bottomore has written (1966:
10):
...a system of rank does not form part of some natural
and invariable order of things, but is a human con-
trivance or product, and is subject to historical
changes. More particularly, natural or biological in-
equalities, on one side, and distinctions of social
rank on the other, belong to two distinct orders of
fact. The differences were pointed out very clearly by
Rousseau in a well-known passage: 'I conceive that
there are two kinds of inequality among the human spe-
cies; one which I call natural or physical, because it
is established by nature, and consists in a difference
of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of
the mind or of the soul; and another, which may be
called moral or political inequality, because it
depends on a kind of convention, and it is established,
or at least authorized, by the consent of men. This
latter consists of the different privileges, which some
men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of
being more rich, more honoured, more powerful, or even
in a position to exact obedience.
To understand the development and maintenance of occupational in-
equality, we must, then, come face to face with issues of power
and the distribution of resources, within an occupational sphere
and at the societal level, and in such a way as to attend to
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shifting historical conditions with the passage of time. This
endeavor requires a re-conceptualization of the notion of
profession.
A traditional definition of a profession is (Cogan, 1953: 49),
"a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the
theoretical structure of some department of learning or science,
and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding...applied
to the practical affairs of men." The definition does not accom-
modate either all of the occupations usually considered as profes-
sions, such as law which is not based upon a scientific body of
knowledge, or exclude other occupations not usually considered to
be professions, such as computer programming. Status variations
in the occupational hierarchy are not adequately explained by this
form of definition or its underlying conceptualization.
The political-economic approach takes a different tack. In
this view the concept of profession is separated from the concept
of occupation. Johnson (1972: 45) succinctly clarifies this point
when he states that "a profession is not an occupation, but a
means of controlling an occupation. Likewise, professionalization
is a historically specific process which some occupations have
undergone at a particular time, rather than a process which cer-
tain occupations may always be expected to undergo because of
their essential qualities." The professional phenomenon, then,
may be viewed as an "institutionalized order of control" over a
set of marketplace activities, which could be arranged in a typol-
ogy of institutionalized orders of control, such as collegial con-
trol (professions) or patronage (Johnson, 1972).
More formally, we suggest that a profession is a quasi-
corporate entity or enterprise whose members have obtained a sub-
stantial degree of control over the production, distribution, and
consumption of a needed commodity. This definition is consistent
with Freidson's analysis of the medical profession in the United
States (1970:n 71) that "the most strategic distinction lies in
legitimate, organized autonomy--that a profession is distinct from
other occupations in that it has been given the right to control
its own work." The degree of control is never complete; its na-
ture and extent vary over time with socio-political, economic,
ideological, and technological developments within the enterprise
and the society. Similarly, the differential status of occupa-
tions in a given time period also varies as a function of the de-
gree and form of control which an enterprise can exercise. The
control exercised by the professional enterprise involves to a
greater or lesser extent:
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I) the definition of the commodity which its special-
ized practitioners produce and distribute;
2) explanations of the relationship of the production
and distribution of this commodity to the broader needs
of the total political economy;
3) delineation of the organizational parameters in and
through which this commodity will be produced and dis-
tributed, including some ability to define the nature
of the workplace with respect to its relation to the
commodity producers, the commodity users, and the con-
cept of commodity itself;
4) definition of what constitutes efficient and effec-
tive production and distribution of commodities (i.e.
how its production and distribution is to be
evaluated);
5) control over resources required to produce and dis-
tribute the commodity;
6) control over demand (i.e. consumer need) for the
commodity, and over the number (supply) of specialized
practitioners who are sanctioned to meet it--that is, a
quasi-monopoly over production and distribution involv-
ing control over education, training, licensing (legal
sanctions), and cultural sanctions (values, beliefs,
customs, etc.).
Structurally, the professional enterprise can be considered to
be a loosely ordered interorganizational system of occupational
control, consisting of: a) individuals who perform roughly simi-
lar specialized functions, primarily as a means of earning a
livelihood; b) associations to advance the interests of these spe-
cialized practitioners and promote occupational cohesion through
political, social, and ideological activities; c) educational and
training institutions to produce, reproduce, and legitimate the
practitioners and their knowledge and skill; and d) cultural and
legal devices to protect the established domain of occupational
specialization.
The formation of successful professional enterprises and their
continued hegemony over an occupational domain is not a haphazard
occurrence. New enterprises are formed purposively by innovative
entrepreneurs who have sufficient incentives, access to the neces-
sary resources, and organizing talent. More specifically, people
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will be motivated to found new enterprises when (Stinchcombe,
1965: 146,7):
(a) they find or learn about alternative better ways of
doing things that are not easily done within existing
social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future
will be such that the organization will continue to be
effective enough to pay for the trouble of building it
and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social
group with which they are strongly identified will
receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing
things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources of
wealth, power, and legitimacy needed to build the or-
ganization; and (e) they can defeat, or at least avoid
being defeated by, their opponents, especially those
whose interests are vested in the old regime.
These characteristics of individual motivation are affected by
social structural conditions in a complicated kind of interaction
which accounts for both the rise of various classes of organiza-
tion In historically specific time periods, such as guilds during
medieval times, and their particular modifications and variations
based on prior organizational history and social technologies
available at the time (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich, 1979). In ac-
counting for the appearance of a population of organizational sys-
tems, ecology has greater explanatory power than psychology.
Thus, to complete Stinchcombe's thought (emphasis added),
Better ways are communicated socially; the future is
partially guaranteed by social arrangements and dis-
rupted by social convulsions; the pattern of iden-
tification of individuals with groups which will bene-
fit, and the legal protection of the appropriated bene-
fits, are social phenomena; the patterns of trust and
of mobility of resources which can determine whether
resources can be moved to innovators are socially pat-
terned; and the distribution of power in society is an
aspect of social structure.
The general rise of professions as a form of occupational con-
trol in 19th century industrializing societies corresponds to the
rise of other related forms of social organization aimed at reg-
ulating production-distribution-consumption activities, most nota-
bly business and governmental corporations and trade unions. The
transformation of feudal society to industrial capitalism over
several centuries provided the social structural conditions neces-
sary for the rise of these organizational forms. To summarize
these conditions briefly, they include:
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(1) ECONOMICALLY - the development of a market (or mon-
ey) economy as a dominant cultural force apart from the
religious, political, and social fabric of life into
which it was indistinguishably interwoven in an earlier
era; the rise of "free laborers", capitalists, and
landlords selling their services on the market for
land, labor, and capital; and the corresponding growth
of a middle class of consumers of commodities with the
appearance eventually of the phenomenon of consumer
"demand" (Heilbroner, 1970: 64);
(2) IDEOLOGICALLY - the principle of economic liber-
alism aimed at establishing and perpetuating a self-
regulating market through laissez-faire and free trade
policies (Polyani, 1957: 132); the doctrine of indi-
vidualism that justifies laissez-faire, that "the good
of all will be served if each individual pursues his
self-interest with minimal interference" (Wilensky and
Lebeaux, 1965: 34); rationality as applied to the dis-
covery and application of knowledge and its manifesta-
tions in social organizations and the allocation of
scarce values;
(3) POLITICALLY - the evoluation of citizenship as an
(initially restricted) institution protected by civic,
political, and social rights,--especially: (civic) in-
dividual freedom and freedom of thought, religion, and
the right to own property, to contract, and to justice
or due process; (political) the right to participate in
the exercise of political power as a member of a body
invested with political authority or as an elector of
its members; and (social) the right to a measure of
economic welfare and security according to standards
prevailing in the society, social services, and educa-
tion (Marshall, 1964: 71-2);
(4) SOCIALLY - a vast increase in urbanization, and in
specialization in the divison of labor involving a de-
cline in unskilled occupations and a growth of semi-
skilled, technical, and managerial work (Heilbroner,
1970: 102); and the creation of new classes that even-
tually displaced the old;
(5) TECHNOLOGICALLY - the growth of science and a
myriad of technological inventions and their rapid dif-
fusion throughout society; and a concomitant social
reconstruction of the meaning of time, family, and
work.
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It has been argued that the conditions outlined above can be
found to a greater or lesser degree in all industrializing societ-
ies, capitalist or socialist. As Wilensky and Lebeaux have stated
(1965: 44- 5 ),
Much of what is called 'capitalism' turns out to be
features of economic organization common to all highly
industrialized countries, whatever their culture; (2)
the uniqueness of capitalism is often a matter of
degree--for something resembling the doctrines of
economic individualism if not the free market is found
in noncapitalistic societies as well...
...Capital, mechanization, a monetary system of ex-
change, double-entry bookkeeping, the conversion of
property rights into monetary terms, stable nation-
states, the emergence of a working class--these are
universal features of highly developed economies. They
are all present in the more recent development of Ger-
many, Japan, and the Soviety Union, countries which
could hardly be lumped together as capitalist.
While Wilensky and Lebeaux's observations of the objective fea-
tures of economic development may be true, the "matter of degree"
is not a matter to be passed over lightly, if we hope to under-
stand the more particular forms of social organization within dif-
ferent advanced industrial societies. Despite occupational
specialization and differentiation, the medical profession in
Great Britain obviously has much less control over the production-
distribution-consumption functions of health care than its en-
trepreneurial counterpart in the United States. Nor does the so-
cial work enterprise look quite the same in these countries (Par-
ry, Rustin, and Satyamurti, 1979). Despite the leavening quali-
ties of industrialization, the shape of the professional phenome-
non in the USSR is also a unique product of the country's politi-
cal economy (Haug, 1975).
Stated differently, then, the relationship of the division of
labor to the hierarchical distribution of resources is a function,
not of industrialization, but of the political, economic, and so-
cial structures through which industrialization occurred in a
given society, and the ideology that interpreted and thereby
helped fashion the industrialization process. For the United
States, the culture of capitalism cannot be separated from in-
dustrialization; it has been its major defining force. The study
of the professionalization of an area of specialized work, there-
fore, requires an analysis of a complex set of relationships
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between and among occupational groups and segments therein, power-
ful elites, and consumers interacting in an encompassing, highly
competitive market economy. The central concern in that inves-
tigation is to find out how, within that dynamic political econo-
my, some particular occupational segment succeeded in establishing
control (as a profession) over its sphere of occupational
specialization.
A Political Economic Model of Professionalization
The achievement of professional status by an occupational
group is a complex process. Minimally, for each separate profes-
sion it involved a group of organizers who wanted a professional
enterprise and were able to garner the resources to construct it.
Since professionalization is a population phenomenon,--a species
of organization (identified here as the professional enterprise)
emerged during a specific historical time period--it also involved
a nurturant environment, an environment with sufficient resources
and information, of a particular kind, distributed in some usable
fashion, that could be tapped by occupational entrepreneurs. A
political economic model fits this version of professional
development and should help clarify its dynamics.
Political economy, defined descriptively, is "the interrela-
tion between a political system (a structure of rule) and an
economy ( a system for producing and exchanging goods and ser-
vices)" (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17). Political economic analysis
entails the study of both systems and their interrelationships
along the following lines (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17):
...In general, analysis of political systems has two
major components: (1) ethos or values, and (2) power
system. That is, 'political' encompasses both power
and the values (ends) which power is used to achieve.
...An economy is a system for producing goods and ser-
vices. A description of an economy consists of two
parts: (1) a statement of the goods and services pro-
duced, their quantities, and through which organiza-
tional forms they were produced; and (2) a definition
of the mechanisms, rules, and institutions that shape
exchange of goods and services.
Since political power is often used to control the distribution of
resources, and the accumulation of resources is an important
source of political power, political economic phenomena are not
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easily separable into their respective categories. The utility of
the model, however, lies in this interaction.
The outlines of a political economic model for the development
of the professional enterprise can be constructed around three
sets of relationships and their interaction, --the relationship of
the developing enterprise to: (1) the economic system; (2) soci-
etal elites and the class structure; and (3) competitive occupa-
tional segments within its specialized domain and the overall oc-
cupational hierarchy. We should like to begin our model construc-
tion at an abstract level with a brief overview of power relations
in a dynamic environment. We shall then sketch in more detail
some of the concrete tasks and variables that affected the profes-
sional project in the United States during the growth of in-
dustrial capitalism.
THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND EXCHANGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL PROJECT
Occupational groups with professional aspirations needed an
environment with the right kind and amount of resources to con-
struct a professional enterprise and the capacity to take ad-
vantage of the available opportunities. Stated differently, the
environment positively selects out those organizational forms that
fit with or match its complex of opportunities and constraints
(Aldrich, 1979). Variations among and within occupational groups
in a given environment also affect selection, helping to explain
the success and failure of professional endeavors, hence the
stratification of occupations. The strategic role of environmen-
tal variables places boundaries on the activities of the founders
and sustainers of any organizational endeavor. It is axiomatic
that, from their standpoint, the greater their ability to control
relevant environmental variables, the greater their chance for
success.
For any new or continuing organizational endeavor, the ele-
ments of the environment that must be available and/or subject to
control in some favorable mix consist of (1) customers (both dis-
tributors and users); (2) suppliers of materials, labor, capital,
equipment, and work space; (3) competitors for both markets and
resources; and (4) regulatory groups, including governmental agen-
cies, unions, and interfirm associations. Dill (1958) conceptual-
ized this set as a task environmentp because these are the salient
environmental elements that an organizaton must concern itself
with in order to carry out its mission or achieve its ends. We
would add to this list (5) symbolic information, organized in the
form of political ideologies. Political ideologies are socially
constructed beliefs and ideas which explain and justify the claims
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that groups make for their resource requirements and allocations
(Silver, 1980), as for example, the sanctity of science and tech-
nology. They become an important resource themselves for the cre-
ation and exercise of power.
The task environment can be conceived of as a political econo-
my or an exchange field within which aspiring occupational groups
operate. The characteristics of the environment or field define
the parameters of constraint and opportunity for such groups, as
well as their contingencies, --that is, the degree to which task
environment elements may be subject to control or predictable.
Control is never complete; it varies with the composition, struc-
ture, and dynamics of the field. For example, financial support
in the hands of a benefactor is relatively clear as to its poten-
tial size and the conditions under which it might become avail-
able. Financial support based upon consumer demand is a much less
determinate resource. Thus, the nature of the task environment
elements--their substance, relative scarcity, distribution, acces-
sibility, exchangeability, and stability all contributed to the
rise of professions and the relative success of individual occupa-
tional efforts. 7
Applying some of these ideas to the rise of professions, it
might be argued that the pre-industrial occupational environment
was essentially resource-poor, placid or static, and dispersed.
Occupational groups operated within local consumer markets, sepa-
rated from one another by the rigid boundaries of the social
stratification system. The rules for production-consumption-
distribution were well established by social class, and supported
by legal regulations and tradition. Technology was undeveloped
and its rate of development was slow. Information among the dif-
ferent actors in the exchange field travelled slowly; actual and
potential linkage among these actors, that is, the state of inter-
connectedness, was low. The prevailing sense of time and distance
affected both the individual and the collective sense of social
change.
By contrast, during the period of industrial capitalism, when
professionalization was taking place in the United States, roughly
1850-1930, the environment was much more complex, competitive,
dynamic, and resource-rich. A labor market and a consumer market
for professional services were being created and expanded through
the growth of a "free middle class," unfettered by social class
privilege and tradition. Coalitions of occupational groups were
forming. Capital was being organized in new ways and new corpo-
rate forms were emerging. Regulations and norms governing
economic exchanges were open to strategic manipulation. New tech-
noogy was being rapidly created and diffused alongside the spread
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of literacy and education. Many of these changes were intercon-
nected, signaling a coming significant change in the state of the
field as a whole (Emery and Trist, 1965). The environment, in
short, provided a rich climate for opportunistic planning, as so-
cial, technological, and political economic development expanded
the possibilities for linkage and control.
The concept of task environment is useful for understanding
the interplay of power and exchange during the process of profes-
sionalization. In order to professionalize, an aspiring occupa-
tion group needs to control the resources in its task environent,
and it interacts with others to obtain them. To the degree that
their exchange partners in the task environment (individuals,
groups, organizations) control the needed resources, the occupa-
tional group lacks the power to accomplish its ends. Thus, in an
exchange relationship, power is a function of control over
strategic resources, or independence. The greater the control,
the greater the independence, hence power; the less the control,
the lower the power, and the greater the dependency on whomever
does control a strategic resource (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962).
So, for example, the need of an aspiring occupation for money to
staff a professional association may or may not be problematic.
It may lead to dependency on a private foundation which then gives
the foundation a corresponding degree of power to define the pro-
fessional project; it may obtain these funds from its own members,
retaining more membership power to define the professional proj-
ect; it may fail to locate resources altogether and either find a
viable substitute, or go without. If the strategic resource is
critical, the occupational group's efforts may fail.
In sum, in a complex and dynamic exchange field, or political
economy, transactions go on simultaneously among many interrelated
actors. The composition, structure, and dynamics of the field
mediate these transactions. Power is a function of strategic
resource control or the ability to manage environmental contingen-
cies The result of this continuous interplay is a highly politi-
cized climate with both fixed and shifting power arrangements
among the actors. Power shifts among different factions in the
professional enterprise and/or its task environment as conditions
change and competing elements are able to mobilize to take ad-
vantage of them. In a context of resource scarcity, "cooperation,
competition, and conflict (are) transitory elements in a process
to accumulate resources and achieve autonomy" (Silver, 1980: 23).
Autonomy, of course, is the goal of an aspiring occupation. In
market terms, when an aspiring occupation gains enough power in
its task environment to regulate the production-consumption-
distribution processes of its specialized commodity, largely by
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itself, its drive for professional status will have been
accomplished.
Tasks and Strategic Variables
During the last half of the 19th century in the United States,
the growth of industrial capitalism opened potential new markets
for specialized occupations and the possibility for gaining access
to the older segregated markets of the traditional "professions."
These opportunities stimulated various occupational groups to em-
bark on the construction and expansion of professional enterprises
for their economic self-interest. In some instances, these ef-
forts were mutually supportive; in others they competed for
resources and turf. Collectively, however, they shared the same
ideological terrain, founded on the enduring tenets of U.S.
political economic ideology: the sanctity of private property,
the philosophy of economic Individualism, the value of opportunity
(Hofstader, 1960: viii). They also faced similar problems
negotiating a course through the still nascent market economy.
In order for the professionalizing sectors of a growing "mid-
dle class" to organize and control these competitive markets, they
had to accomplish several tasks. Ideologicaly, they had to con-
struct a "monopoly of credibility" with the public to secure a
clientele, and they had to conquer "official privilege" so as to
obtain "a set of legally enforced monopolies of practice." The
precondition for successful management of these external ideologi-
cal tasks was an internal task, "the unification of the cor-
responding areas of the social division of labor under the direc-
tion of a leading group of professional reformers." The heart of
the unification project was the creation of a system of training
which would centralize and standardize the production of the pro-
fessional commodity, namely, the professionals themselves, who
gained the specialized expertise (Larson, 1977: 16-17).
To fully explicate the political economic model, these tasks
can be refined into a more specific set of economic, political,
and ideological tasks which the founding members of any profes-
sionalizing occupation need to carry out to successfully build an
enterprise.
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ECONOMIC TASKS
(1) create.a marketable (needed) commodity;
(2) ensure sufficient production of the commodity by:
a) securing and training a production force,
b) securing production sites,
c) instituting centralized systems of product con-
trol to maintain a commodity of standardized
quality;
(3) acquire control of outlets for distribution and
sales;
(4) establish and negotiate an acceptable rate of re-
turn for investors;
(5) create a consumer market of clientele for its
commodities.
POLITICAL TASKS
(1) induce individuals and groups of potential pro-
viders and other resource holders or managers to invest
labor and capital in developing and producing the com-
modity, providing work space, distribution outlets,
etc.
(2) define the boundaries of the new enterprise so as
to include and exclude desireable and undesireable
members;
(3) establish the domain of the enterprise by overcom-
ing competitors for resources and markets;
(4) negotiate favorable agreements with regulatory
bodies to protect investments in the enterprise
(preferably a monopoly).
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IDEOLOGICAL TASKS
(1) convince the potential members of the enterprise
that they share a joint mission;
(2) convince legitimating bodies that the enterprise is
worth sanctioning, --including relevant segments of the
ruling class;
(3) convince the public of the superior quality of and
necessity for its commodities.
Though similar to other industrial ventures, some aspects of
this organizing effort are (and were) unique because of the un-
usual type of commodity to be marketed. Variations in the com-
modity and in other, less singular but still strategic resources
and their management, account for the differential success of par-
ticular professionalizing occupations In the past. They also con-
tinue to affect the professional phenomenon in the present. We
shall list three variables and briefly discuss them here in order
to complete a political-economic model. Divided into three groups,
they are:
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
(1) the intangible quality of the commodity;
(2) patterns of consumer demand, consumption, and
distribution;
(3) the ability to attract producers to join the
enterprise.
POLITICAL VARIABLES
(1) the social status of the founders and other members
of the enterprise and the strength of their ties to
members of the ruling class;
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES
(1) ideological justification and the capacity to com-
municate it.
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These variables are not Independent of one another. For example,
the social status of the founders affects the ability to attract
selectively other producers as well as the political ideology of
the enterprise. However, they may vary independently of one an-
other. In addition, the political process in an exchange field is
a function of multiple opportunities, contingencies, and ideologi-
cal constructions, and the skills which actors bring to the inter-
play. The analysis of individual professionalizing efforts ulti-
mately involves sorting out these variations and determining the
effects of combinations of multiple interactions on the outcomes.
The Intangible Quality of the Commodity
Professionalizing occupations had, and continue to have, a
unique set of production and distribution problems that derive
from the nature of the commodity they seek to exchange in the
marketplace. For most professions the commodity is an abstract,
intangible service of uncertain worth--"an intellectual
technique"--rather than a tangible good with ultimate utility (use
value) which is immediately visible or apparent to a potential
consumer or investor. In Larson's words (1977:4),
...professional work, like any other form of labor, is
only a fictitious commodity; it 'cannot be detached
from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized', and it
is not produced for sale. Unlike craft or industrial
labor.. .most professions produce intangible goods;
their product, in other words, is only formally alien-
able and is inextricably bound to the person and the
personality of the producer.
This intangible quality creates several difficulties pursuant to
establishing a degree of market security sufficient to offset high
"investment and production" costs. Mainly they can be considered
under the headings of visibility and cognitive superiority.
For a commodity to be marketable, it must have sufficient
visibility for potential consumers and investors to identify it as
something they value. This visibility, in turn, depends upon both
perceived utility and standardization, or how well the commodity
can be identified in the public's mind with the solution of a
problem, meeting of a need, or resolution of an uncertainty felt
as real and significant. "Professional" commodities vary in their
potential to demonstrate visible benefit. Some are inherently
more "useful" because they can be defined by the producers in
terms of individual, clearly articulated needs for a large group
of potential consumers, such as legal services to obtain a
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favorable contract or judgement regarding disputed life, limb,
property; or medical care to treat conmmon afflictions or specific
maladies. The benefits of other types of "professional" commodi-
ties may not be as readily apparent because they are bound up with
conflictual societal values and/or more ambiguous individual
needs, such as psychiatric treatment or social work services.
In the interplay between meeting needs and shaping needs, the
desire of producers to establish the immediate utility of their
commodities may also affect the way they define them for the
public. An example Is the representation of health care as the
treatment of illnesses or individual "curing" rather than "preven-
tion." Furthermore, the utility of some commodities may be easier
to demonstrate because the relationship between the applied tech-
nology and a beneficial outcome may be dramatic and direct rather
than indirect, close In time sequence rather than protracted, or
empirically more capable of support, hence less subject to debate
about beneficial effects. Medicine has had many of these ad-
vantages in its professionalization efforts. When a commodity
controlled by a professionalizing occupation is also, in fact,
demonstrably superior to its competitors, e.g. sulfa drugs by
physicians, the construction of a professional enterprise may be
greatly advanced.
Standardization of an intangible commodity, as with the more
tangible goods, enhances its visibility for several reasons. It
allows the commodity to be recognizeable to a wide public; it
facilitates claims to a defineable professional domain; it makes
conmodity production possible in dispersed locations but identifi-
able with the same occupational group; it facilitates production
of sufficient quantities to meet market needs. In a situation
where new professional markets had to be developed altogether
during the industrial revolution, standardization was a major
requirement.
But standardization also poses some unique problems. Since
the "professional" commodity is not separable from the producers,
the ability to produce it in sufficient quantity and quality, uni-
formly, requires that "the producers themselves be reproduced. In
other words, the professionals must be adequately trained and so-
cialized so as to provide recognizeably distinct services for ex-
change on the professional market" (Larson, 1977:14). In in-
dustrial terms, in effect, the situation requires quality control
over the mass production of human beings who will attain mastery
over "an intellectual technique" which can be marketed as distinct
and recognizeable services. This degree of control necessitates
highly selective screening of applicants and rigorous education
and socialization in a standardized setting where the producers
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can closely supervise and regulate the training process. Institu-
tions of higher education, programmatically controlled by pro-
ducers, lend themselves to these needs better than apprenticeship
arrangements in diverse settings. During the generational period
of the professional project, the development of compulsory educa-
tion, the growing prominence of science, and the growth of the
modern university all complemented the requirements of the profes-
sional market. In the new industrial democracy, higher education
became the convenient arbiter of merit--achieved status over
ascribed status--through the use of purportedly universalistic
criteria for recruitment and performance evaluation. In the pro-
cess it abetted and legitimated professional monopoly by these
same criteria in the occupational sphere and the ever more subtle
perpetuation of social stratification (Larson, 1977).
The difficulties of securing a professional market are com-
pounded by the intangible quality of the "professional" commodity
in still another way that also supports the thrust towards monopo-
ly. Ultimately, the intangible quality is a function of the more
abstract "theoretical" principles of the cognitive base that un-
derpins the specialized technology. Internally, while battles
over cognitive superiority may be quite intense (Turner and
Hodges, 1970: 26), colleagues can still make a reasoned, even
scientific, assessment. Externally, since the layman does not
ordinarily share the specialist's universe of discourse, evalua-
tion is more difficult. The professional has difficulty es-
tablishing the authority which will make a client seek out profes-
sional advice and follow it. Therefore, cognitive superiority
must be partially established through ideological means. Some
commodities have greater potential for ideological exploitation
than others, and some occupations by their nature can make better
use of institutionalized ideological supports to advance their
claims for functional authority. The trappings of educational
credentials, expensive office furnishings, prestigious associa-
tions, social status, and legal regulation often substitute as
supportive data for any public evaluation of cognitive superiority
(Freidson, 1970). When a legally protected monopoly of practice
can be established, the professional enterprise gains official
sanction for its expertise which now does not have to be con-
tinously proven.
Patterns of Consumer Demand, Consumption, and Distribution
A profession is a form of collegiate control by a group of
practitioners over a set of production-consumption-distribution
activities of a specialized occupation. Other forms of control
are also possible, namely patronage and state mediation. With
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patronage, subdivided into oligarchic and corporate types, con-
sumer control over occupational services becomes institutional-
ized. "Patronage arises where the dominant effective demand for
occupational services comes from a small, powerful, unitary clien-
tele" (Johnson, 1972:65), either an aristocratic elite or a small
number of large-scale corporations who may become major consumers
of the 'expert' services. With mediative control by the state,
"the state intervenes in the relationship between practitioner and
client in order to define needs and/or the manner In which such
needs are catered for" (p. 77). State mediation can be distin-
guished from corporate patronage by public agencies in that "the
state attempts to remove from the producer or consumer the au-
thority to determine the content and subjects of practice" (p.
77). In all of these forms of occupational control, patterns of
consumer demand and consumption represent the major sources of
environmental uncertainty affecting the form of institutional con-
trol which develops.
Occupational control in the form of professions appeared in
the latter part of the 19th century with the emergence of an urban
bourgeoisie who provided consumers for specialized services and
the recruits for the body of aspiring practitioners. Successful
professionalization could not occur without "an effective demand
for occupational skills from a large and relatively heterogeneous
consumer group" (p. 51). In an environment with only a small num-
ber of powerful clients, a professionalizing occupation would lack
the broad base of support necessary to secure a sizeable market
investment and/or it would be highly dependent upon meeting the
needs defined by the group paying for its services.
Professionalization efforts benefit as well from an unor-
ganized consumer population because organization can be an effec-
tive means to balance power dependency by consumers through col-
lective control over the demand for services. In this respect,
the recent development of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's)
and third party payment systems in the United States have led to
some shifts in the control of professional medical services,
though not yet to a national health service. Services provided to
consumers on a one-to-one, fee-for-service basis through solo or
group partnership arrangements also strengthen professional con-
trol, despite the contention of classical liberal economists that
this arrangement maximizes consumer choice. Consumer power is
decreased, rather than maximized, when the consumer population is
large and heterogeneous, and the provider group is carefully re-
stricted, and when large inequalities exist In the ability to pay
for services. Furthermore, the individual approach reduces the
consumers' ability to collectively define problems, needs, and
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roles, and thereby potentially to alter the demand for certain
kinds of benefits or services.
The professionalizing efforts of both law and medicine
benefitted from the type of consumer population which was avail-
able in the mid-19th century and their pattern of demand. Both
professionalizing occupations provided services for an expanding,
urban, middle class market, which sought and paid for them on an
individualized basis, whether privately or entrepreneurially.
"Needs which had been restricted to the upper stratum of society
filtered down and outwards so that medicine, law, and architec-
ture, for example, were no longer small, socially prescribed
cliques, but large associations servicing competing status groups
of near equals" (p. 52). Engineering, on the other hand, provided
technical and economic consultation that could be better assessed
by its consumers, and, more to the point, engineers were generally
salaried employees of large-scale economic enterprises rather than
independent consultants or entrepreneurs (Larson, 1977: 27). In
still a different pattern, social work services in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries were neither sought out nor paid for by
the direct users of the services, the urban poor. The real clien-
tele of social workers were the philanthropists, and eventually
the state, who actually paid for the services and thereby re-
stricted the collegiate control that social workers could es-
tablish in their sphere of occupational expertise.
As is evident from the above, other consumption patterns also
affect the ability to professionalize. While consumer utilization
of specialized services is usually a voluntary matter, the need
for particular services is affected by socio-cultural patterns and
is distributed differentially according to socio-economic status.
Need itself is, therefore, elastic--subject to custom, economic
capacity, and ideological manipulation. The struggles to build a
profession and a corresponding professional market have involved,
not only the identification of need, but also its creation. With
the pre-eminence of the professional phenomenon in 20th century
industrial capitalism, the role of powerful professions in creat-
ing need has come under scrutiny and sharp criticism. The tenor,
if not the substance, of this critique is captured in the
trenchant writing of Ivan Illich (1977: 27).
The disabling of the citizen through professional
dominance Is completed through the power of illusion.
Religion finally becomes displaced, not by the state or
by the waning of faith, but by professional establish-
ments and client confidence. The professions appropri-
ate the special knowledge to define public issues in
terms of problems. The acceptance of this claim
legitimizes the docile recognition of imputed lacks on
the part of the layman; his world turns into a chamber
of needs. This dominance is reflected in the skyline
of the city. Professional buildings look down on the
crowds that shuttle between them in a continual
pilgrimage to the new cathedrals of insurance, health,
education, and welfare. Homes are transformed into
hygienic apartments where one cannot be born, cannot be
sick and cannot die decently...
Consumption patterns and demands also may affect the ability
to control the distribution of a specialized commodity. In
patronage and state mediative arrangements, where definition and
demand for a commodity are much less strictly regulated by the
producers or the marketplace, as for example with public school
education, the distribution of services is also much less subject
to producer control. This lack of autonomy may contribute to
crises of legitimacy for a professionlizing group (Baum, 1978).
Additionally, the nature of the specialized commodity or ser-
vice itself affects the ability of producers to control its dis-
tribution. For example, routine medical examinations can be per-
formed in a private office, but non-routine medical care often
requires other facilities, e.g. the hospital or nursing home, and/
or other specializations. Though education can be provided on an
individual tutorial basis, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and
sometimes pedagogy as well, educational services do not lend them-
selves well to such individualistic arrangements. Thus the dis-
tribution requirements of specialized commodities vary as to:
size and complexity of physical facilities machine implements and
hard technologies (computers, x-rays, etc.), ancillary labor,
interdependencies with other specialized groups (heteronomy), le-
gal sanctions, and legitimacy. All of these distribution require-
ments represent sources of dependency in its "task environment"
that a professionalizing occupation must deal with successfully to
gain collegiate control. These dependencies may also change for
many reasons, as for example, newly organized demands by consumers
for more control over the commodity, or the need for new and
sophisticated technologies controlled by other specialized groups,
or competitive professionalizing occupations. The relationships
between production and distribution, as well as production and
consumption, then, may become major sources of tension for an
aspiring occupation or an existing profession.
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Ability to Attract Producers
The construction and continuation of a professional enterprise
requires a steady stream of recruits able and willing to pay for
the protracted education (and overhead set-up costs in some cases)
to become its specialized experts. Since investment costs in time
and money are high, potential recruits have to be convinced that
their endeavors will be worth it socially and financially. Once a
professionalizing group has established its monopoly of practice,
the attraction of producers is simplified. In the absence of such
a monopoly or prior to its attainment recruits must be attracted
on other grounds. Usually these have involved the promise of in-
dividual payoffs in the form of social status, high incomet secure
career, autonomy over the conditions and content of one's work,
social class socialization to the value of intellectual of "gen-
teel" vocations, and/or a persuasive mission or ideology.
In general, the ferment of industrial capitalism provided a
rich soil for recruitment. The expanded middle classes formed a
labor pool; individualism as a pervasive value orientation
stressed individual status and financial remuneration as worthy
cultural objectives; the university became the arbiter of merit,
the accepted agency of individual social mobility and legitimator
of social status; the growth of large public and private corpora-
tions offered new opportunity markets for occupational specializa-
tion; and science and research applied to all manner of human en-
deavor were optimistically advanced as the avenue to alleviate
social stress. Even so, professionalizing occupations varied in
their ability to attract producers.
Professionalizing occupations with a core of elite producers
trained in already prestigious universities--the older "learned"
professions of medicine and law--had the advantage of prior social
standing and accepted mission to lend to their attractiveness.
Taking medicine as an example, while battles for control among
sub-groups raged during the last half of the 19th century, and
medical societies actually lost their licensing powers for a time
before the Civil War, the field continued to attract large numbers
of prospects. Despite, or perhaps because of the title "doctor,"
at the turn of the century, the United States had one of the high-
est doctor-to-patient ratios in the world (Larson, 1977). But if
the average yearly income of most doctors was low, in the laissez-
faire market system of medical practice, so were the costs of be-
coming one. When the American Medical Assocaition eventualy suc-
ceeded in gaining control of the medical schools in the early de-
cades of the 20th century, and forged the educational reforms that
enabled professionalization (in our terms), the desired effects of
market monopoly were set in motion. The number of medical schools
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and the supply of physicians decreased, the length of education
and training was extended, and access to the profession was great-
ly restricted, particularly for women, blacks, and working class
persons. At the same time, the status and income of the average
physician was considerably improved (Larson, 1977: 164).
New aspiring professions or those whose status, financial
promise, and autonomy were less certain because of the clientele
they served or the organizational context of their work, relied
more on ideological persuasion to attract recruits. These occupa-
tions benefitted from the ideology already attached to the profes-
sional concept in general, such as an association with "science"
and education, as well as the substantive ideological potential of
the particular aspiring vocations, such as the nobility of public
service moral reform, or social Justice. These professionalizing
occupations, such as nursing, social work, teaching, already in a
disadvantageous position in the occupational hierarchy, remained
much more open to women, minority group members, and working class
persons who were excluded from the older "professions" by the os-
tensibly neutral meritocratic criteria that masked sexual, racial,
ethnic, and social class discrimination.
Founder Status and Ties to Power Structure
Occupational groups whose members are connected to societal
elites have a competitive advantage in the political and ideologi-
cal struggle to establish a monopoly of practice. Wealthy elites
command the resources to define and legitimate knowledge, values,
priorities, social problems and needs and different ways of meet-
ing them. They can sanction a professional enterprise, invest
resources in its development and upkeep, and help it to fashion
and control its consumer market.
Members of the "learned" professions of law, medicine, and
theology brought a pre-industrial inheritance of wealth, aris-
tocratic traditions and ties, political title, and university
education (with little technical expertise) with them into the
competitive 19th century period of professional expansion and
development In medicine, to use an example from the archetypical
profession, this inheritance gave physicians in the United States
a competitive edge over other healing occupations to establish
themselves as the controlling segment(Freidson, 1970a, Larson,
1979).
The nineteenth century United States was a society with a spa-
cious frontier and an egalitarian ethic. As one form of healer on
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the scene, physicians did not have a demonstrably superior tech-
nology9 nor could they regulate producer or consumer markets. For
the elite of physicians, connected to the most prestigious medical
schools, urban hospitals, and public offices, this situation was
temporarily worsened by the reform of higher education in the
186 0's which brought technological and professional training and
scientific research into the universities and set off an era of
tremendous expansion (Ben-David, 1964; Bledstein, 1976). The new
middle classes now had access to credentials and legitimacy for a
broad range of healing practices.
As medical specialities developed within the physician group
and outside it, e.g. nurses, midwives, chiropractors, homeopathic
doctors, surgeons, the medical field also became confused and
over-crowded. To oversimplify a complex history for the sake of a
point, ultimately, through its connections to the corporate and
university power structure, the elite specialists from the most
reputable Eastern medical schools prevailed over the medical do-
main. An enforcement of licensing became more feasible through an
expanding network of county medical societies, the Flexner Report
of 1910, also promoted by the MA and funded by the Carnegie Foun-
dation, spurred the reform of medical education and the consolida-
tion of the medical field under the "scientific doctors." Flex-
ner's recommendation, essentially for "fewer and better doctors"
was not the most significant aspect of this history; high level
commissions commonly make recommendations that are never followed.
Rather, it was that the recommendations were sanctioned and imple-
mented through resources controlled by societal elites. According
to Larson (1977: 164),
Much more than official sanction and punitive measures,
foundation money brought about the implementation of
Flexner's recommendations. The leading foundations
clearly favored the Northeastern medical establishment:
between 1911 and 1936, The Johns Hopkins Medical School
got about $10 million of Rockefeller money and $2 from
the Carnegie Corporation. Between 1910 and 1938, the
nine leading foundations gave more than $154 million to
medical schools, most of it going to the best private
schools. The Rockefeller General Education Board gave
slightly under $66 millon to only nine schools.
Recently, in "The De-professionalization of Everyone?", Haug
(1975: 211) advanced the perceptive proposition that "societal
trends, both technological and ideological, are rendering the con-
cept of profession obsolete," so that the future may bring, not
the end of expertise, but de-professionalization in the sense of a
status-equalizing process. The forces challenging and eroding the
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historic importance of status for professionalization include:
the rise in the general educational level of the public, attacks
on credentialism without the requisite experiential component,
trends towards patient and consumer education in specialized
fields, the availability of technological information stored in
computers and readily retrievable, mistrust of the service ethic
as evidence in malpractice suits, and the stiffer monitoring of
the rights of human subjects in experiments, --in short, a general
weakening of professional autonomy and authority. "The de-
professlonalization of everyone would usher in an age of the
client as consumer, a consumer who Is expected to question, com-
pare and treat all advice with a skeptical ear," and "the moral
and evaluative overtones of the professional model" would decline
(Haug, 1975: 212).
Haug's observations can be accepted without reaching the same
conclusions. There is no evidence that the capitalistic vision of
economic man has been seriously weakened in U.S. culture. We as-
sume that in a competitive capitalistic society prestige will con-
tinue to be associated with occupation and income. Therefore,
occupational groups will continue to compete for status, creating
and re-creating an occupational hierarchy. Since expertise alone
is not the basis of occupational prestige, even if expert
knowledge becomes widespread and the consumer more assertive, oc-
cupations that already have attained the status of "profession"
and the monopoly that goes with it, and other aspiring occupa-
tions, will still value and protect the rubric of "profes-
sionalism." This assumption in no way implies professions forev-
er. It does suggest, though, that our current economic, politi-
cal, and social institutions would need to be modified. When pro-
duction and allocation decisions are not so strongly governed by
the political economy of the marketplace, differential status
could eventually be based on criteria other than occupation and
income. In this new context, professions may then lose their so-
cial class trappings to disappear entirely or be replaced by a new
occupational hierarchy based upon characteristics consistent with
the new social order.
Ideological Justification and Communication Capacity
As part of their political struggles for monopolistic privi-
leges, professionalizing occupations must engage in several
ideological tasks. These involve convincing relevant segments of
the ruling class and the public of the merits of their demands for
autonomy, and that privileges, once granted, will not be abused,
but on the contrary, will benefit society. Successful exercise of
these ideological tasks in the main requires two kinds of
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ideological resources: (1) the construction of a persuasive
rationale or justification; and (2) an effective capacity to com-
municate proof of the occupation's merit.
The justification for monopolistic advantage that aspiring
occupations developed in the 19th and 20th centuries fit with the
tenets and values of industrial capitalism; it also helped to
shape its development. Eventually, this justification became an
ideology of professionalism still used by aspiring occupations
today. As discussed in earlier sections, the content of this pro-
fessional ideology centered around the cognitive superiority of
specialized knowledge/technology based on science as a method, and
the norms of impartiality, objectivity, and non-commercial ad-
vantage embodied in a service ideal. This ideology was responsive
to and promoted at the same time such dominant values as indi-
vidualism, free competition, the application of science (as a
method and a world view) and technology to human endeavors and
social progress, and the rationalization of the economy and com-
munity life to secure a stable environment for business and indus-
try (Kolko, 1963; Wiebe, 1967). It supported and received sup-
port, in turn, from such major developments as the reform of the
university to be more compatible with the industrial world and its
rise as a status-transforming and status-conferring institution,
and the growth of large-scale bureaucracies in the public and pri-
vate sectors of the political economy. In the eyes of at least
one observer, this professional ideology would have to be placed
as the centerpiece of an entire culture of professionalism that
permeated middle class life in the United States between 1840 and
1915 (Bledstein, 1976).
Ambitious individuals in America were instrumental in
structuring society according to a distinct vision--the
vertical one of career. The most emphatically middle-
class man was the professional, improving his worldly
lot as he offered his services to society, expressing
his expanding expectations at ascending stages of an
occupation. Professionalism emerged as more than an
institutional event in American life, more than an out-
ward process by which Americans made life more ratio-
nal. It was a culture--a set of learned values and
habitual responses--by which middle-class individuals
shaped their emotional needs and measured their powers
of intelligence...
Professionalizing occupations vary in their capacity to use
the ideology of professionalism strategically, either because they
cannot convey an image sufficiently consistent with the ideology
or because their capacity to communicate the proof of their claims
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is in some way deficient. Ideological resources to communicate
justification include: symbolic resources--the status of the
aspirants as a symbol itself, and the special language and
dramaturgy of their practice; and formal and informal vehicles of
communication--journals, textbooks, conferences, conventions, oc-
cupational associations, and the mass media. The symbols associ-
ated with an occupation can convey or reinforce persuasively a
belief in the highly unique knowledge and skills of its prac-
titioners. "The more abstract and ambiguous the language, the
more superhuman the practitioners and their challenges are por-
trayed, the more exclusively the occupational dramaturgy is en-
acted with clients (who must assume the good faith of the prac-
titioners) rather than customers, the more convincing these sym-
bols are... " (Nilson and Edelman: 1976: 24). A familiar illustra-
tion of the power of symbols to justify occupational prestige has
been the successful, long-running, and stereotypic TV portrayal of
the ethical sensitivity, drama, and skill of physicians and
lawyers at work. Similar efforts to portray social workers and
nurses have been unsuccessful.
Conclusion
Each of the perspectives we have presented above regards the
professional phenomenon differently, and as such takes a different
stance towards professonal ideology. The ideology of profession-
lism has become an accepted part of the dominant ideology of
United States society. "Put forward by established authorities,
the dominant ideology praises traditional arrangements, denies the
existence of conflicts of interest between authorities and subor-
dinates, and opposes political change...Its major significance
lies in its influence over how alternatives are defined" (Karznel-
son and Kesselman, 1975: 356,7). In capitalist society, "ideology
conceals the existence of class and the basic structure of ex-
ploitation" and "emphasizes individualism and individual solu-
tions" (Larson, 1977: 156).
The structural-functional perspective of professions accepts
and supports the dominant ideology. Professions are viewed as
liberating for society, an integrative force that brings the
wisdom of science to the service of the public interest. Social
class is not an issue. The processual perspective questions pre-
vailing arranagements in the division of labor, viewing these as
the outcome of a pluralistic political process in which occupa-
tional groups must engage. It does not question the competition
over status and rewards nor the basic structure of inequality it-
self. The ideology of professionalism is supported by accepting
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and using its tenets as the measure and means of achieving profes-
sional status. The general assumption is still that professions
are beneficial for all groups, and social class is, therefore, not
a concern, except as it may become an issue in individual service
delivery.
The political-economic perspective ties professions squarely
to social class. Professions are an integral part of the social
stratification system in United States society. As Western soci-
eties were transformed by the industrial revolution, professions
arose like other corporate ventures to take advantage of newly
forming economic markets. In a competitive and rapidly expanding
capitalist economy, workers who had information and services to
sell--an intellectual technique--needed to find a means of pro-
tecting their labor. Those workers who could garner resources by
virtue of individual talent and the advantages of institutional
ties to the structure of power--through family, education, and
social class positions--were able to consolidate occupational
functions in a given sphere and control them by building a profes-
sional enterprise. Professions tie workers into an existing power
structure and serve it through their expertise in order to advance
their own class interests and status aspirations. With the domi-
nant ideology thus exposed to criticism, professions can be exam-
ined as potentially detrimental or obstructive to the objective
interests of other groups. The structure of inequality is laid
bare as a fundamental issue.
The issue is not merely academic. The willingness of social
work professionals to examine structural inequality and their part
in preserving it can be a beginning step in the re-definition of
capitalistic institutions to more socialistic patterns. The pre-
requisite of that re-definition, however, is the development of
class consciousness. Here professional ideology is notably
obstructive.
Among the many changes in post-modern society, the most heral-
ded have been the unprecedented growth in the numbers of profes-
sionals, managers, and white-collar workers, and the centrality of
theoretical knowledge for development, planning and policy analy-
sis (Bell, 1973). The questions are whether this potentially
powerful aggregation constitutes a new social class, who belongs
to it, and whether it can become conscious of its objective inter-
ests and united around the reduction of structural inequality
(Wenocur, 1975). Professionals clearly belong to a middle or up-
per-middle economic stratum in the society, but to know that is to
know very little. "There are many intermediate strata, con-
veniently referred to as the 'middle class,' the boundaries of
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which are difficult to state exactly, and membership in which can-
not be determined in any simple fashion" (Bottomore, 1966: 12).
Ehrenreich and Ehrenrelch (1977) among others have argued that a
coherent professional--managerial class Is emerging, whose members
share an overrising common ?culture" or lifestyle, despite some
internal antagonisms. Perhaps. But the ideology of profes-
sionalism within this class is divisive;9 it inhibits the develop-
ment of a progressive, shared political consciousness.
The issue of structural inequality is especially pressing for
social workers in post-modern society. For not only does social
work have a unique historical tradition rooted in social reform,
but its mission brings social workers into daily contact with poor
and working class people who suffer most from Inequality. Social
workers (not alone among professionals) are caught between their
class interests as aspiring professionals and their democratic and
humanitarian ideals. If they hope to act on their ideals as they
come to terms with the multitude of issues facing the profession
in post-modern society, they need to explore and understand the
historical development of social work from a political economic
perspective. We believe this will enhance the capacity of social
workers to find socially progressive alternatives, and in concert
with other progressive groups, eventually to create a different
social reality.
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NOTES
1. The figures in this table were compiled from two sources: 1)
The Statistical Abstract of the U.S.; 1975 U.S. Factbook, Table
No. 568, "Employed Persons by Major Group and Sex: 1950-1974", p.
350, U.S. Bureau of Census, Department of Commerece, October 1974;
and 2) a summary of three tables presented by Lewis Corey in "The
Middle Class", contained in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin
Lipset (eds.) Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social
Stratification, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953, pp. 371-380. The
three tables which were summed were Tables Nos. 3, 4, and 6, In-
dependent Professionals, Technicians, and Salaried Professionals:
1870-1940. The original source for these tables was the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census.
2. Wilensky has used the dual attributes of technical/scientific
knowledge and the service ideal to challenge the contention that
the occupational structure as a whole is becoming more profes-
sionalized (Foote, 1953). This is a particularly convenient bit
of ideology because it contains a number of unproven assumptions
about the virtues of professions and does not seem measureable in
any reliable fashion. According to Wilensky (1964: 148) neither
specialized technique nor theory is sufficient for the profession-
lization of labor. There is an optimal base for professional
practice "neither too vague nor too precise, too broad nor too
narrow."
If the technical base of an occupation consists of a
vocabulary that sounds familiar to everyone (social
science and the arts of administration) or if the base
is scientific but so narrow that it can be learned as a
set of rules by most people, then the occupation will
have difficulty claiming a monopoly of skill or even a
roughly exclusive jurisdiction.
By the same token, rules which govern working conditions and pro-
duction standards may help assure "technically competent, high
quality work," but do not ensure that a service ideal will be fol-
lowed. Nor can union rules, which are designed to protect em-
ployees more than the public, be equated with the "moral norms" of
established professions. An example of the former would be
seniority rules; an example of the latter would be the routine
referrals made by professionals to their colleagues, even if a fee
is lost, when the client's needs fall outside one's own domain of
specialized competence. Nor are either of these attributes alone
sufficient for an occupation to claim professional recognition.
Both must be present.
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3. Professional movements differ from social movements in many
ways. The analogy holds best in terms of the presence of shared
ideology, interest group association, and the passions engendered
in the struggle for professionalization. The analogy breaks down
in the consideration that the ideology Is not a counter-ideology
to an established institutional order, but rather a struggle by
groups with resources for a still greater share and more powerful
position in the existing institutional structure.
4. "In the fifteenth century the Inns of Court were active educa-
tional institutions. They were, in effect, the residential col-
leges of a (purely legal) university, filling the gap left by the
exclusion of the common law from any place among the studies pur-
sued in the recognized seats of learning" (Carr-Saunders and Wil-
son, 1933: 37).
5. Civil servants were university-trained clerks who studied
civil law to pursue careers in the civil service. With the reces-
sion of church influence, both civil lawyers and canon lawyers
declined before the 16th century. Common lawyers, not requiring
training in the university, became prevalent and were involved in
a wide range of legal and semi-legal activities (as they are to-
day), such as politics and various administrative/managerial posi-
tions (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 2943).
6. U.S. institutions were influenced by this transformation in
many ways, though a feudal system never existed in the United
States. This historical difference partially accounts for the
differences in the structure of U.S. professions compared to those
in Europe.
7. A number of organizational theorists have described the com-
position and structure of organizational envrionments. Some of
these include: Levine and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Aiken and
Hage, 1968; Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968.
8. This section is based upon the work of Terence Johnson, Pro-
fessions and Power, 1972, and unless otherwise indicated all
quotations are from this source.
9. The Professional-Managerial Class consists of "salaried mental
workers who do not own the means of production and whose major
function in the social division of labor may be described broadly
as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class
relations" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1977: 45).
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